#Unherd political stance license

Though speculations that the Japanese wartime nuclear weapons program achieved any significant results lack evidence, North Koreans were able to “inherit” at least mined and processed uranium as well as the knowledge acquired during the work of DPRK scientists and technicians at Japanese facilities. One of the technical bases of Japan’s nuclear program was located in the northern part of Korea, near the city of Heungnam (now Hamhung).

The technological base of the North Korean nuclear program, however, started forming during the Japanese annexation of Korea. The dominant opinion among scholars is that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was able to start and develop its nuclear program mainly due to the technical and technological assistance of the USSR and China. The DPRK’s national nuclear program started in 1952, when the North Korean government established its Atomic Research Institute. How the North Korean nuclear program started This puts into question the viability of the existing approaches to the DPRK and the feasibility of achieving a KPNI solution. To date, none of the efforts by the international community-including Six-party talks, pressure and diplomatic efforts, and more recently, activity started by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 2018-2019-have yielded tangible results in addressing the issue. NAPSNET SPECIAL REPORT BY ANASTASIA BARANNIKOVA KOREAN PENINSULA NUCLEAR ISSUE: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS FEBRUARY 5 2022įor the last three decades the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue (KPNI) has been considered as one of the most serious threats to security and stability in NEA (Northeast Asia). MacArthur Foundation.īanner image: Child foraging, UNICEF here DPRK nuclear warhead, Rodong Singmun, here II. Īcknowledgement: The NU-NEA project is funded by Nagasaki University and the John D.

#Unherd political stance license

This report is published under a 4.0 International Creative Commons License the terms of which are found here. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on significant topics in order to identify common ground. The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. This report is a part of a joint project on Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Weapon Use in Northeast Asia (NU-NEA ) and has been cross-posted by the Asia Pacific Leadership Network here, and the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition (RECNA), and the Panel on Peace and Security of North East Asia (PSNA) hereThe year 1 final report of the project is now available here Anastasia Barannikova argues that the DPRK’s nuclear status has already been accepted as a part of the regional status quo, and attempts by other actors to change the DPRK’s nuclear status would be destabilizing to regional security.Īnastasia Barannikova is a research fellow at ADM Nevelskoy Maritime State University (Vladivostok, Russia) and non-resident senior fellow of Mongolian Institute of Northeast Asian Security and Strategy (Mongolia).